| Issues in health sector regulation | |||
| Informational asymmetries leave health service consumers vulnerable to indifferent service quality, unnecessary tests and treatments and uncompetitive prices. In most countries professional self-regulation has been their main defence. However, there is theoretical, and growing empirical, evidence that the incentives professional `clubs' have to regulate health service quality volume and price are weak and, in some cases, perverse. Some would argue that such pervasive market failures justify public intervention. However, cost-effective public strategies have proved to be elusive in practice. These seminars explore some of the issues involved. | |||
Looking at health sector regulation the other way around Cecilia Pyper Health Services Research Department of Public Health, Oxford Regulating quality and price in private UK health markets David Costain, Deputy Medical Director, BUPA Health insurance regulation in the UK Martin Graham, Director of Consumer Affairs Policy and Research, Office of Fair Trading Rationing and regulation for a cost-effective NHS Diane Dawson, Centre for Health Economics, University of York Regulation for cost-effectiveness in pharmaceutical Markets Adrian Towse, Office of Health Economics Building a health service in transition economies Antonio Duran, Director, Tecnicas de Salud, Spain The impact of financial incentives on the behaviour of GPs Carol Propper, Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol |
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