New from OPI Our study of `regulation, motivation and the NHS reforms' at UCLH is now well underway. Follow its progress on a new webpage. OPI is collaborating with the Cambodia Development Resource Institute in an Equitap study led by the Institute for Health Policy, Sri Lanka to explore the way catastrophic healthcare is financed in Cambodia.
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Public sector innovations |
What makes teachers `tick’? |
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Innovations in the public sector have the potential to reduce costs, improve quality and increase the diversity of public services. Despite research interest, innovations in the provision of public services are under-researched compared with private sector innovations. As a result, important questions remain unanswered. Is it true, as widely believed, that public sector innovation, diffusion and adoption rates are low? Why do some countries innovate (Singapore in health financing) and others don’t? What are the incentives that drive or deter public sector innovation? OPI is working with the China Executive Leadership Academy, Pudong and the India Development Foundation in Delhi to begin to answer some of these questions.
Most read OPI papers The most read papers on OPI’s website during the past three months were: Trust in Healthcare Sachiko Ozawa The economics of ‘public sector motivation’ Martin Karlsson Public service motivation and performance incentives Jerrett Myers Organisations are ‘cakes’ not cars: getting the public sector incentive mix right Fiona Murray Do we need a theory of government before we measure government effectiveness? Matt Andrews
OPI welcomes papers that focus on the incentives and institutions that motivate public sector performance. Articles might highlight a current or emerging issue, develop a topic for further research, describe a piece of theory or offer some empirical evidence. The guidance notes are available here. If you would like to contribute, please contact the OPI editor. |
Ros Levacic (Institute of Education, London): Teacher contracts and performance Teacher quality is said to be a key driver of educational performance and much attention has been devoted to understanding the incentives that motivate teachers to perform well. Ros Levacic describes how the principal-agent theory offers some analytical clarity in assessing the extent to which various types of contract motivate teacher performance. The paper explores several practical difficulties associated with the design of teacher contracts including the heterogeneity of intrinsic motivations between teachers in the workforce, the extent to which teaching outcomes can be attributed to teacher effort and the complexities induced by multiple teaching objectives. The existence of multiple `principals’ compounds the difficulty of rewarding good performance as teachers are typically expected to satisfy a varied set of interests including parents, pupils, professional associations, head teachers and educational authorities. Read the paper here. In the context of a principal-agent theory, teachers might be considered to be ‘agents’ of an educational authority, answerable to the legislature who is the ‘principal’. What happens when teachers are given guaranteed representation in the legislature, in effect acting as both ‘principal’ and ‘agent’? Geeta Kingdon and Mohammed Muzzamil describe the case of the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, where teachers have become legislators and where, as a result, teacher associations and unions have been successful in pursuing their demands through strikes and other forms of industrial action. This has resulted in the improvement of their pay, job security and service benefits, while less progress has been made on broader improvements in schooling such as the promotion of education in general or improving equity and efficiency in the system. The analysis provides interesting insight into what can happen when teachers enjoy considerable influence over their own contractual arrangements and security of tenure. Read the paper here. |