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BUDGETARY DEVICES THAT DELIVER

POLICY BRIEF

Although good economic performance has also helped, there is evidence that improved management of public budgets in OECD countries has helped to constrain public spending and reduce fiscal deficits. Five factors appear to have been important: the development of better enforcement mechanisms; a shift to multi-year budget and expenditure plans; the increased use of split-level budget management processes; a general move towards output-based accountability; and the introduction of better accounting systems. These changes have had implications also for the roles of the central budget office. Changes in the 'rules of the budget management game' in OECD countries offer lessons that may be applicable elsewhere.

1. Introduction

Much modern budgetary reform has been concerned with changing the institutions governing budget management and thereby reducing the likelihood of systematic biases towards poor fiscal out-turns. Although there are differences between OECD countries, there has been increased acceptance that results are influenced by the 'rules of the game' governing the budget process. The OECD economic survey of June 1998 showed that there were 10 OECD countries – the highest number for a long time – expecting a fiscal surplus, with another nine countries expecting a reduced deficit. For some countries, the consolidation had been substantial. Between 1993 and 1997, for example, the budgetary bottom line strengthened by 11.4 percentage points of GDP in Sweden, and by 9.8, 7.1 and 6.8 percentage points in Greece, Finland and Italy respectively.

In most cases, the favourable fiscal developments represented an improvement in the structural balance[1], but often they coincided with more favourable cyclical conditions. Thus, real GDP grew at an average annual rate of about 2.8 per cent across the OECD during 1993-97, compared with about 1.8 per cent in the preceding four years. But structural deficits declined as well: by 2.5 per cent of GDP in 1993-97 among the G-7 countries, and by 3.4 percentage points across the European Union.

This is not to suggest that structural deficits had disappeared: they were still widespread and, in many cases, substantial – 0.9 per cent of OECD GDP in 1998, compared with 1.1 per cent in 1997 – and they still accounted for 90 per cent of actual deficits. None the less, as Figure 1 confirms, it is clear that there had been a significant shift in the relative contributions of spending and taxation to fiscal consolidation.

Bringing about these changes has not been easy. This paper sets out to assess the challenges and achievements of public budget management reform in the OECD. Section 2 of the paper summarises the nature of the fiscal reform problem. Sections 3 to 7 review the five broad areas in which reforms have been undertaken. Finally, section 8 considers the implications for the role of the traditional central budget office.

2. The challenge of aggregate fiscal reform

The problem of 'excessive' government spending can be characterised as an example of 'the tragedy of the commons': the common good demands self-restraint, but no-one gains individually by exercising restraint. Instead, individual interest in higher spending conspires to produce a loss to all that comes to light only with time. Consequently, sectoral, departmental and individual political or economic interests are promoted with little concern for the aggregate position. Only the finance minister has an interest in the protection of the whole, and this may or may not be valued by the president/prime minister and the electorate. This creates room for opportunistic behaviour.

> 'excessive' government spending is an example of 'the tragedy of the commons'

There may also be an asymmetry in the way economic actors evaluate gains and losses. They

1 The structural deficit is constructed by adjusting the actual deficit for the effect of the business cycle in each year. This adjustment involves estimating potential GDP and then applying estimated elasticities of taxes and expenditures with respect to GDP to calculate what the deficit would have been if actual output had equalled potential output. For details on the OECD methodology, see Claude Giorno *et al* (1995), 'Estimating Potential output, output gaps and structural budget balances', *OECD Economic Studies*, No. 24.

may dislike a certain amount of loss more than they would value the same amount of gain, in which case they would be less likely to agree to a reduction, than to pursue an increase, in spending. In collective decision-making processes, this may introduce an upward bias in spending, not necessarily matched by higher tax revenues.

Some systemic features of traditional public management add to the likelihood of upward bias.

These include:

- poorly-developed product markets for public services, making the public sector a monopoly supplier, with tax-supported expenditure being a captive purchaser;
- non-existent 'control' markets, making public-sector supply immune to market-based monitoring and pressure;
- complex, incoherent or unstated goals, making allocation to highest value hard to determine, and often compounded by unclear *post hoc* accountability;
- limitations on the passing of authority down the line to where information is more complete; and
- unequal access to information, placing higher-level decision-makers at a severe disadvantage relative to their lower-level counterparts.

Taken together, these problems present major challenges to the task of fiscal reform.

3. Commitment and enforcement mechanisms

It is difficult for an entity as powerful as a government to commit itself credibly to a stated course of action, because of the means available for changing its mind. A number of the new fiscal frameworks, however, have been designed to impose costs on governments for deviating – or at least deviating capriciously – from a course of fiscal responsibility. Noteworthy innovations that have helped to build credibility in commitment include:

Figure 1: Recent expenditure performance in OECD countries

1A: General government: Year-on-year change in total outlays



1B. Contribution to fiscal consolidation for OECD countries

Year-on-year change of total outlays and current receipts
(Positive change means positive contribution to consolidation)



- international agreements that promise benefits if fiscal targets are met;

- legal requirements that commit governments to account for their performances and to provide transparent and timely financial reports; and

- the establishment of medium-term budget targets.

International agreements. The global fiscal targets incorporated in the *Maastricht Treaty* as 'convergence criteria' for European Monetary Union (EMU) are an example of the first innovation. Most European Union (EU) countries now refer to the Maastricht criteria as primary goals, and the obligation to meet the targets is greater because they have been agreed by a peer group of countries with common objectives. As Figure 1 shows, EU countries have reduced total outlays by a greater amount since the 1990s peak than other members of the OECD.

Table 1: Composition of budgetary adjustments 1993-1997
(cyclically adjusted, as % of trend GDP)

	increase in revenue > change in primary spending	cuts in primary spending > change in revenue
cuts in capital spending > change in current primary spending	Greece, France, Portugal, United Kingdom	
cuts in current primary spending > change in capital spending	Belgium	Germany, Spain, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden

Source: European Commission, *Convergence Report,* March 1998

EU countries appear also to have used a variety of strategies to consolidate their fiscal positions. Table 1 shows that, in 1993-97, four countries – Greece, France, Portugal and the United Kingdom – mainly used capital-spending reductions and tax increases, while seven countries – Germany, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Sweden – relied more on cuts in primary current spending. Belgium both increased taxes and reduced current spending.

traditional budget management imparts a systematic upward bias to public spending

Notwithstanding these achievements, the recent *Stability and Growth Pact* calls for further substantial consolidation. The durability of the mechanism and the aptness of the targets chosen to date may be debatable, but both existing and potential EMU countries now espouse fiscal rectitude to an unprecedented degree. For the smaller EMU countries in particular, the Maastricht targets provide very compelling reasons for fiscal prudence. Whether the bigger countries, on whom the success of EMU relies, can be disciplined in the absence of credible threats, remains to be seen.

Legislated constraints. The second commitment-enhancing innovation – legislation – has been used to increase fiscal discipline in three ways:

- by limiting political discretion over public spending;

- by requiring governments to make public their fiscal policy and performance; and

- by setting 'rules of thumb' to limit government borrowing.

In the United States, the *Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Acts* of 1985 and 1987, the *Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts* of 1990 and 1993, and the *Balanced Budget Act* of 1997 have provided the main legislative frameworks. The latest budgetary rules set caps on government investment and consumption, and require across-the-board cuts if the annual appropriation bills exceed the caps. Although the caps have been amended annually, real discretionary spending has fallen every year since 1991. In New Zealand, fiscal commitment is enshrined in the *Fiscal Responsibility Act* of 1994 and, in Australia, the *Charter of Budget Honesty* aims to increase transparency in fiscal policy and outcomes.

Other countries are planning to follow suit: the Swiss government has proposed that authorised deficits be enshrined in the constitution; and the United Kingdom has recently announced a *Code for Fiscal Stability* with a number of features similar to the New Zealand law, including adherence to the so-called 'golden rule', and targeted debt and real operating expenditure levels.

Common to all these measures is a requirement to publish reports on key budget and expenditure parameters. The fact that governments repeatedly have to explain the policy rationales behind crucial fiscal indicators builds commitment. It also injects common economic and fiscal outlooks into election debates, and newly-elected governments cannot profess 'shock' at the state of public finances.

the new frameworks impose costs on governments for deviating from fiscal responsibility.

The 'rules-of-thumb' approach is exemplified by the use of the 'golden rule'. The UK's rule specifies that, over the cycle, the government shall borrow only to invest and not to fund current spending (including depreciation and maintenance). The underlying idea is that government investment must be justified by future streams of income and/or services.

A golden rule does not, however, preclude government borrowing to finance investment projects with low economic or social returns; it also does not preclude deficits from exceeding investment in any specific year as long as the rule is fulfilled over the course of the economic cycle. In Germany, the rule can be abrogated in any year only in circumstances of 'macroeconomic disequilibrium'.[2] The Japanese rule is institutionalised by the virtual separation of government 'deficit bonds' from 'construction bonds', with the aim of limiting government borrowing to construction bonds only in the medium-term. Since 1970, the rule – in both its German and UK interpretations – seems largely to have been fulfilled for many individual OECD countries on a national accounts basis, and also for the OECD as a whole.[3]

existing and potential EMU countries now espouse fiscal rectitude to an unprecedented degree

4. A multi-year focus

Legal frameworks and 'rules of thumb' inherently embody also an intertemporal perspective. Since it is hard to be credible when advancing a fiscal policy that is not sustainable, fiscal discipline increases as decision-makers are forced to consider the effects of policy on rates of deterioration and consolidation, and to integrate aggregate tax and debt planning. A medium-term perspective brings into play today the relative harvesting or stewardship of 'the commons' tomorrow. It serves notice to politicians, interest groups, bureaucrats, and other claimants for public funds that there are limits to the responsiveness of government to their demands.

Since 1993, all EU member states have been obliged under the Maastricht arrangements to publish medium-term convergence programmes, including medium-term monetary objectives and their relationship to price and exchange-rate stability, for scrutiny by the ECOFIN council[4]. EMU members are obliged further to submit annual 'stability programmes'. These contain projections for government deficits and debt covering at least the following three years, together with their main assumptions and a description of budgetary measures being taken or proposed. A sensitivity analysis of the effect of changes in the main assumptions on the budgetary and debt positions is also required. The council can recommend corrective actions to member states in the event of significant actual or expected deviations.

Most other OECD countries also publish annual medium-term fiscal strategy programmes. These include New Zealand's annual *Fiscal Strategy Report*, Australia's *Fiscal Strategy Statement* and the United States's *Economic and Budget Outlook*. The independent Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis publishes a pre-election analysis of the estimated impacts of the economic packages proposed by the different political parties. This is a practice that may spread.

A total of 17 OECD countries currently have targets of budgetary balance or surplus between 2000 and 2005. Such global targets, which serve to restrain demands at the start of the budget process, can be grouped into three categories:

- Targets involving one or more of the budget balance, revenue, expenditure, public debt, or government borrowing (usually expressed as a percentage of GDP).
- Desired rates of change in revenue or expenditure.
- Absolute values for the target variable, in nominal or real terms, expressed either as the future level of expenditure or the deficit, or as the extent of desired change from previous baseline projections.

The determination of appropriate targets clearly requires the use of various criteria. Sweden, for example, applies four criteria: the targets should be difficult to manipulate; they should involve a political cost when deviations occur; they should

2 The German golden rule refers to investment in budgetary terms that differ from the national accounts definition in a non-trivial way.

3 This applies if borrowing were allowed to cover a broad range of capital expenditure. If based on a more narrow capital expenditure definition, i.e. government fixed investment only, net lending of most member countries would have surpassed their golden rule level on average during the past 25 years.

4 Some EU countries also publish medium- and long-term fiscal strategy reports on their own, for instance the United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark.

be sufficiently flexible to allow fiscal policy to adjust with the economic cycle; and they should be easy to communicate to the public.

Methodological problems. Despite their increasing use, however, medium-term fiscal frameworks have encountered a number of methodological problems.[5] These include:

- A tendency to overestimate the growth potential of the economy, creating the illusion that additional resources will become available.[6]
- Some ministries have viewed the forecasts as expenditure commitments. This has made changes to existing policies difficult, even in the event of a negative shock.
- Medium-term fiscal objectives sometimes can postpone or undermine pressing short-term consolidation decisions. For example, when demographic conditions are deteriorating in the short term, but are expected to become more benign in the medium term, these fiscal frameworks can give the illusion that there is more room for manoeuvre than is the case in fact.[7]

it is hard to be credible when advancing a fiscal policy that is not sustainable

As a result of such considerations, the Canadian authorities have argued that a medium-term view is not necessarily helpful in achieving the goals of visibility and public support, and have concluded that a short-term focus is more appropriate for dealing with consolidation.

There are also significant problems with longer-term budget forecasting. Because ageing populations exercise the greatest single influence on expenditure trends, the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Denmark have prepared long-term forecasts covering 30-40 years in an attempt to capture the budgetary impacts of demographic trends. In adition, several countries, including the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, New Zealand, Iceland and the Netherlands, have prepared, or are preparing, inter-generational accounts in order to assess the long-term implications of current policies for the distribution of costs and benefits across generations.

despite their increasing use, medium-term fiscal frameworks embody several methodological problems

By their nature, however, long-term forecasts tend to be indicative rather than predictive, and their projections for future economic activity are susceptible to wide variations. Moreover, inter-generational accounts are subject to a number of severe measurement and methodological problems that have generated some scepticism. Consequently, the employment of such long-term frameworks has been neither as widespread nor as uniform as for medium-term planning and forecasting.

5. Sectoral versus agency allocation

Another important development has been to consider budget aggregates separately from sectoral aggregates, and sectoral aggregates separately from programme allocations. This can increase the hardness of the budget constraint by reducing demands for additional spending through cascading commitments. The implication is that new expenditure demands can be funded only by across-the-board cuts or by targeted cuts. Many countries have shown a preference for the latter approach, which allows resources to flow from less-valued to more-valued areas. The process is akin to a two- or three-level game, where the goals of coordinated action are ranked more highly than individual goals.[8] Additional incentives for budget-reducing behaviour include the promotion of bureaucrats and ministers who are seen to be prudent budget managers. Commitment at the executive level is rendered even more credible if ministries are deprived of avenues for seeking increased resources, by the legislature's agreement to aggregates within which detailed estimates must be prepared.

In Iceland, for example, 'frame budgeting' – which consists of an initial cabinet decision to establish an expenditure frame for each ministry for the ensuing year – has done much to restrain demands for new expenditures. It has helped also to reduce the stock of existing expenditure programmes, and to make way for new ones. France has also followed this new budgetary procedure, using a preparatory ministerial meeting to determine overall mandates within which ministries must draw up itemised budgets.

6. From detailing inputs to managing outputs

Decentralised budget management. Central budget offices do not have the information

5 Multi-year Budget Forecast, *Budgeting for the Future*, OECD, PUMA/SBO (96)3.

6 Evidence for this is found in the experiences of Canada, Finland, France and the United States. See, `Managing Structural Deficit Reduction', *OECD Occasional Paper*, No 11, 1996.

7 This was noted in the OECD report *Maintaining Prosperity in an Ageing Society*.

8 See, for example, Robert D Putnam, 'Diplomacy and domestic policy; the logic of two level games', in P B Evans *et al* (1993), *Double-Edged Diplomacy*, University of California, pp 431--468.

required to make the best lower-level allocative decisions. Many countries are responding to this problem by giving agencies greater freedoms in operational decisions, while attempting to ensure that those charged with these decisional rights are held more directly accountable for the results.

Australia, New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom, among others, already allow agencies almost complete discretion over spending on running costs, but within aggregate limits, accompanied by strict restrictions on rates of increase and on the number and remuneration of senior officials. There are often also restrictions on transfers between programmes and running costs, to ensure that the focus remains on efficiency. Ministries and agencies may be permitted to carry over unused funds to the following year and, in some cases, to pre-spend a portion of the next year's budget. In 1999, 17 OECD countries authorised agencies to carry over unspent funds, and in eight countries agencies had power to draw down funds from the following year's budget.

many countries now give spending agencies greater operational freedoms within aggregate and accountable limits

An important aspect of this incentive regime is that future indicative funding levels are not reduced by under-expenditure in a previous year. Unsurprisingly, however, tougher tests have to be employed to control drawdowns. In several countries, including Canada, incentives have been increased by allowing agencies to earn interest on funds carried forward and by charging them interest on pre-spent funds.

Under other arrangements, ministries or agencies are allowed to retain all or some of the revenue they raise from user charges, even in tight budgetary situations. In some countries, too, agencies may be credited with all or a portion of the proceeds from asset sales. These measures have raised concerns, however, about a weakening of spending control by the legislature and the central budget office.

Contracting arrangements. The traditional idea of the purchaser-provider contract is being broadened significantly to include budgetary agreements between the central budget office and spending ministries and, even within ministries, between ministers and chief executives. The United Kingdom and New Zealand have made widespread use of such contractual performance arrangements. Similarly, Australia has developed resource agreements between the department of finance and individual departments or agencies.

The ease of contractability for output performance, however, is far from uniform. The range and complexity of contracted services has been increasing: from tangible services, such as issuing licences and passports (easy to contract), to personal services, such as training and education (harder), and to other non-tangible services, such as policy advice (harder still).[9] But the impetus towards contracts means that more thought is going into assessing the risks associated with producing outputs, compared with their expected benefits.

Benchmarking. The introduction of performance targets is also being recognised increasingly as a useful tool for achieving improved value for money from public spending. The targets are normally established through identification of best practices and other reference criteria in comparable public or private organisations. The UK government has begun seeking 'benchmarks' for comparing the performances of its public-sector agencies against both private-sector and public services in other countries. The initial findings of this exercise indicate that the approach may well be effective in assessing the overall performance of organisations. Australia has even benchmarked its own budget-formulation process; and New Zealand has made benchmarking a central part of its new output-pricing review process.

performance targets and indicators should concentrate on deriving information of use to decision-makers

Measuring performance. The principle of providing line managers with flexibility, backed by requirements for better performance, seems clearly desirable. The evidence for its effectiveness, however, is harder to obtain. Systematic examination of the output costs of government sevices over time is difficult for a number of reasons, not the least being the failure of governments to measure output routinely, and the tendency for governments to make changes in organisational and accounting procedures, thereby reducing the comparability of time-series data.

A study in New Zealand set out to examine the costs of production of some typical government outputs over time.[10] The outputs included titling of property, handling of social security claims and processing of immigration applications. In general, the results were pleasing: there was evidence that costs had moved downwards and quality upwards

9 See C Pollitt, *Integrating Financial and Performance Management*, OECD, forthcoming.

10 J Brumby, D Edmonds, K Honeyfield (1996), *Effects of Financial Managerial Reform in New Zealand*, Australasian Evaluation Society.

in the years immediately following the introduction of performance-based budget management. Causality, however, could not be proved.

An OECD-commissioned study examined the relationship between increased managerial flexibility and aggregate fiscal out-turns in nine countries between 1986 and 1997.[11] The hypothesis here is that greater responsiveness in the movement of resources at the line-management level reduces the pressure on spending caps and renders fiscal consolidation, based on reductions in spending, more likely to succeed. Defining 'success' as two consecutive years of deficit improvement, or debt reduction in the second year after consolidation, there were 21 successful and seven unsuccessful cases (see Table 2). The study showed that consolidation efforts in countries with high managerial flexibility were less likely to fail than in countries with low flexibility. Moreover, all stabilisation efforts in countries with high managerial flexibility were persistent, whereas seven of the 17 episodes in countries with low flexibility were short-lived.

Table 2: Managerial flexibility and consolidation success

	Low	High
Unsuccessful	7	0
Successful	10	11

Note: the exact Fisher test allows rejection of the hypothesis of independence at a 5% significance level.

Source: Strauch, *op cit*

There are two main issues to be addressed in developing performance indicators. First, too narrow a range of measures can distort organisational behaviour: for example, measuring only costs per unit of tax collected may induce a tax office to avoid prosecuting complex and costly tax-evasion cases. Second, correction of deficiencies requires some degree of integration either in the resource allocation system or in personal performance management, or both.

It is possible also to become overly zealous in trying to develop performance measures. The effort should probably be concentrated on deriving information that will be of use in decision-making and can assist in promoting the dynamic concern of improved efficiency in resource allocation. The present trend in assessment of wider organisational performance is to move to a scorecard approach.

7. Better accounting

Large-scale changes in apparent costs on the basis of cash accounting can emerge by altering disbursement profiles without changing the underlying costs. This may induce poor decision-making. Increasing demands on the part of financial markets, politicians and citizens for reliable information about public-sector finances has generated a shift towards accrual accounting in general, and is likely to lead, in time, to the adoption of accrual budgeting among the OECD membership. Accrual accounting embodies a number of characteristics which explain its superiority over cash-flow accounting:

- It recognises the financial implications of transactions (or decisions giving rise to transactions) when they occur, irrespective of when cash is paid or received.
- It seeks to match the costs incurred during a particular accounting period with the benefits earned, and revenues with goods or services provided.
- The relationship between revenues and expenses enables the determination of profit, and permits an assessment of the net cost of providing goods and services.
- The relationship between assets and liabilities makes it possible to assess an organisation's financial position.
- A full set of accrual statements also includes cash-flow statements, so there is no loss of the latter information.

Another argument in favour of adopting accrual accounting in the public sector is that it removes the barrier preventing private-sector-trained financial managers from entering public-sector management. This is important for creating sources of innovation, and also for removing the monopoly on the knowledge of public agencies' financial conditions.

accrual accounting methods offer significant advantages to the public, as well as the private, sector

Four OECD countries (New Zealand, Iceland, Australia and the United Kingdom) either have adopted, or have firm plans to adopt, full accrual accounting and budgeting practices. Another four – Canada, Finland, Sweden and the United States – have taken steps to adopt accrual principles for their whole-of-government financial reporting, but not their budgeting. Three other countries (Netherlands, Ireland and Germany) have adopted accrual standards for individual agencies, generally on a pilot basis. South Korea also has

11 R. Strauch, *Managerial Flexibility and Fiscal Performance*, OECD (forthcoming).

announced that it will take this path, while France is considering it actively. The transition would be accelerated if financial markets began rewarding countries for making the commitment to accruals. There is evidence that individual states in the United States of America that use accrual information are able to borrow more favourably than states using cash accounting.

8. Implications for the budget office

Notwithstanding these reforms, the central budget office still has the lead role in maintaining budget discipline. Increasingly, however, its role is to develop and manage institutional arrangements most likely to achieve budget efficiency. In a results-oriented climate, the budget office will concentrate on:

- devising a more effective system to control budget totals and establish priorities among programmes;
- integrating budgeting with other management processes;
- requiring spending agencies to measure performance and evaluate results;
- developing new guidelines and methods for holding managers accountable; and
- promoting new information and reporting systems.

These changes have profound implications for the orientation and skills of the budget office. The difficulties of the new job, and of managing the risks in the transition, should not be underestimated. There remain numerous sources of interference in the quest to integrate performance and financial management orientations, including the incentives faced by politicians, line agencies' desires to protect their own patches, turf wars between other agencies, and the general problem of attributing some notion of responsibility for outcomes.[12]

> **creating an 'efficiency culture' is the most important remaining strategic task for the centre**

The creation of an 'efficiency culture' is probably the most important strategic task left at the centre. The central budget office has to accept that its job is not to take over the policy and programme aspirations of the line agencies. It is likely to mean a much lower investment in operations and a greater investment in analytical skills to provide strategic advice on institutional design and second-opinion sectoral issues.

The new institutions suggest that political will does not occupy a space completely separate from these matters. Political decision-makers, in the end, respond to the incentives before them. The institutions of budgeting, however, can be employed to influence these incentives.

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The work on which this paper is based was undertaken while Jim Brumby was head of the Budgeting and Management Division in the Public Management Service at the OECD. The views expressed are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the OECD or its member countries.

12 These points are taken up by Pollitt *op cit.*

Changing controls and changing roles: the case of Sweden

The ministry of finance updates the multi-year budget framework and recommends the total level for the coming year and the following two years and indicative funding levels for 27 spending areas for consideration at a cabinet budget meeting.

Each ministry is responsible for allocating the total level of funding in its respective expenditure area among appropriations. Thus, every minister acts as 'finance minister' within the limits set. The ministry of finance itself largely withdraws from the budget formulation process during this phase.

Agencies now receive one single appropriation to fund all of their running costs with no restrictions on the choice of inputs. Instead, the new accountability regime calls for ministries to specify the results desired of agencies in a 'letter of instruction'. Agencies' annual reports are audited by the National Audit Office. (*Budgeting in Sweden, 1998*)

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